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The Conservatives: their Sweetest
Victory?
Les Conservateurs : la plus douce des victoires ?
Tim Bale and Paul Webb
1 Virtually nobody standing for,  or  working for,  the Conservative Party at  the general
election of 2015 expected it to win an overall majority. True, there were those who were
more bullish about the party’s prospects than many of the pundits and pollsters who
published their predictions in the week running up to the poll – but in most cases only to
the extent that they believed that the Tories would emerge not just as the largest party
(the consensus view of the forecasters) but with enough seats to make it likely that they
could put together a minority government or else renew the coalition with the Liberal
Democrats that had governed the country since May 2010.
2 Both Jim Messina, the veteran of the Obama campaign who David Cameron had brought
in to advise the Tories on voter identification and mobilisation, and Lynton Crosby, the
Australian consultant who was in overall  charge of  the Conservative campaign,  were
quietly confident by polling day itself that the party would win around 300 seats. But
even they were pleasantly surprised at the exit poll. Even then, they didn’t breathe easy
until the result from marginal constituency of Nuneaton came in at 1.50am, showing that
the Conservatives had increased their share of the vote by four percentage points, while
Labour’s had actually dropped. As more and more results came in, it became clear that
the exit poll’s projection had actually understated the Conservatives’ margin of victory:
Mr Cameron would be back as Prime Minister, but more than that – he would be heading
a Tory government which, with 12 seats more than all the other parties in Parliament put
together, would not need to rely on anyone else’s help to run the country.
3 This,  then, was a historic victory, achieved against expectations and in some ways in
defiance of what are sometimes presented as the laws of political gravity. David Cameron
is the first Prime Minister since Margaret Thatcher in 1983 to increase the number of
Tory MPs in Parliament from one election to the next and the first Tory Prime Minister
since Anthony Eden in 1955 to increase the party’s share of the vote. The Tories won 330
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seats (51% of the total) on a vote-share of 37% (just under one percentage point up from
2010). Just as encouragingly, albeit under the radar, they picked up around 500 additional
seats in local government and assumed control of thirty more councils, which, given how
often party activists these days are either elected representatives or their friends and
relations, may help them at the next general election, currently scheduled for 2020. They
will also be advantaged at that election by boundary reforms which, according to some
projections, could effectively give the Conservatives an extra twenty seats or so and mean
Labour will need a swing as big as those achieved by Herbert Asquith in 1906 and by
Clement Attlee in 1945 to win an overall majority next time around.
4 The Conservatives’ improved performance was down in no small measure to what we
might call «the black widow effect’: after mating with their Liberal Democrat coalition
partners, they gobbled them up, taking 27 of their seats. The Tories lost only 2 seats, net,
to Labour, helped by an incumbency effect favouring Conservative MPs who won their
seats  in  2010,  and,  as  we shall  go  on to  suggest  below,  by  being well  ahead of  Her
Majesty’s Official Opposition when it came to voters’ views on which party would best
manage the economy and which had the best leader. In this, they were almost certainly
helped by their campaign, which much like the work done by Better Together before the
Scottish independence referendum, could hardly be called pretty but turned out to be
highly effective. Not only did it manage to focus relentlessly on Labour’s negatives and
neutralise any of its positives, it may also, via its emphasis on the ‘chaos’ inherent in
some sort of Labour-SNP ‘deal’, have persuaded some who might otherwise have wavered
ultimately to vote Tory. Possibly (although only partially) as a result, UKIP, contrary to
much, but not all, conventional wisdom before the election, may well have done much, if
not more, damage to Labour than to the Conservatives in some crucial English marginals.
 
The long-term context: Conservative development,
1992-2010
5 David Cameron, along with George Osborne, has taken the Tories a long way in the ten
years since he became leader towards restoring their reputation as Britain’s (or at least
England’s) “natural party of government”. Indeed, it is easy to forget just how bad things
had become back then. After presiding over the country’s embarrassing and expensive
exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1992, thereby forfeiting public trust in
its ability to run the economy, the Conservative Party turned in on itself over Europe and
was subsequently swept away in the 1997 Labour landslide. Rather than coming to their
senses, however, the Tories headed for the ideological hills, selecting a series of frankly
unelectable leaders and pursuing policies (or at least, adopting a rhetoric and tone) that
looked a long way out of step with where most of the electorate located themselves.1 By
their third defeat in a row in 2005, it had become obvious, even to many die-hard right-
wingers, that things would have to change – or at least be made to look as if they had
changed.
6 Cameron, who offered himself  as the proverbial  “change candidate” appeared to many
(even to some of those who couldn’t bear his incipient sense of entitlement and his claim
to  stand  on  the  pragmatic  centre-ground)  to  be  the  answer  to  the  party’s  prayers:
Eurosceptic without being obsessive,  Thatcherite without being a zealot,  and a gifted
communicator – a politician not only able to convey genuine enthusiasm for national
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treasures like the NHS but to look like he was at  home in the more socially liberal,
ethnically-diverse country that twenty-first century Britain had become. His game plan,
however, was rather more complex than some of his right-wing detractors and some of
his left-wing and socially liberal admirers gave him credit for. He and other “modernisers”
clearly  believed  that  the  Conservatives  must  do  all  those  things  that  Conservative
oppositions (including the one led by Margaret Thatcher between 1975 and 1979) had
done to put the party back in contention. Rather than obsessing over issues which fired
up the party faithful but put off large numbers of voters – especially many liberal middle-
class voters who ought otherwise to be Tory supporters – the party should focus counter-
intuitively on topics, such as the environment, that would symbolise a shift away from its
past.  And it  should insist  that those parts of  the welfare state which (like it  or not)
enjoyed overwhelming public backing, such as the NHS, education and pensions, were
completely safe in the new leadership’s hands.
7 “Team Cameron”, however, did believe in a smaller role for the state and that the public
could be convinced, pace New Labour, that tax cuts and spending reductions wouldn’t
automatically lead to reductions in public services. They just believed that the place to
persuade  people  was  in  government  rather  than  out  of  it.  Unfortunately  for  them,
however, things did not go entirely according to plan. Gordon Brown’s decision not to call
a snap election in the summer of 2007 was followed by a chapter of accidents and then the
global financial  crisis.  All  of this boosted Tory fortunes but effectively put the brand
decontamination operation on ice, meaning that the lead which the Conservatives had
built up over the next year or two was more fragile than it looked. By May 2010, as the
economy began to recover and doubts about the Conservatives’ good intentions began to
resurface now that Cameron and Osborne were talking about “an age of austerity”, a double
digit Tory lead at the end of 2009 had dropped into single figures – so narrow that even a
brilliant  short  campaign would have had trouble getting Cameron over the line – at
around  323  seats  –  for  an  overall  majority.  And  sadly  for  him,  the  Tory  campaign,
although incredibly well financed and equipped (at the national level at least) with what
was  then  state-of-the-art  technology,  turned  out  to  be  anything  but  brilliant.  Little
wonder perhaps that the British Election Study’s panel study found that the Tories ended
up with less support at the end of the short campaign than they had at the beginning.2
8 As  a  result,  the  Tories  had  fallen  short  –  their  lead  on  “instrumental”  evaluations
associated with “valence politics”, namely relative judgements about leadership, credibility
and competence, was enough to make them the largest party in a hung parliament but
was  insufficient,  given lingering  concerns  about  their  real  intentions towards  public
services and how much they had really changed, to afford the party the overall majority
that some Conservative MPs had assumed would be theirs.3 Some of those MPs were even
more alarmed at what happened next. Faced with a Liberal Democrat leadership which
was some way to the right of the majority of their party, but who clearly were not going
to be content  with simply supporting a  Conservative minority government,  Cameron
offered Clegg a full-blown majority coalition. Given that Labour could not match that
offer,  it  is understandable that it  was accepted. But what defies understanding is the
Liberal Democrats’ failure to negotiate an agreement, be it on policy or on portfolios,
which  might  have  given  them  a  sporting  chance  of  claiming  credit  for  what  the
government they had joined would go on to do. Little wonder that William Hague, former
Tory leader and future Foreign Secretary returned from the negotiations and declared “I
think I’ve killed the Liberal Democrats”.4
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The Permanent Campaign: 2010-2015
9 Having  effectively  captured  and  neutered  their  coalition  partners,  the  Conservative
leadership immediately  co-opted them into what  was  a  ruthless  and highly effective
campaign to re-write history and, in so doing, destroy Labour’s reputation for economic
competence. Years of uninterrupted growth after 1997 had allowed Labour to build up a
big lead on the issue and, while that lead had been lost during the banking crisis, the
party had been closing on the Conservatives again as the economy began to recover in the
months leading up to the election. Now, however, it was involved in a leadership contest
in which even the most Blairite of the candidates spent most of their time insisting on the
need to move beyond New Labour rather than the importance of defending its record and
its achievements. Seizing the opportunity provided by this hiatus – and by an emergency
budget supposedly designed to ensure that Britain did not go the way of Greece – Osborne
and  Cameron  (assisted  by  Liberal  Democrat  politicians  desperate  to  persuade  their
erstwhile supporters that they had gone into coalition to protect what they insisted was “
the national interest”), rammed home the message that Labour had, in their words, “maxed
out the nation’s credit card” and “failed to fix the roof while the sun was shining”, thereby
giving the impression that “the mess” they were having to clear up was due not so much
to a global crash as to Blair and Brown’s supposed profligacy and mismanagement. This
was enough to ensure that even when,  as Shadow Chancellor Ed Balls  predicted,  the
Coalition’s austerity programme damaged (or at least delayed) the recovery, Labour was
unable to capitalise on its temporary distress. Labour’s difficulties in turn meant that
when the economy at last began to grow again, after Osborne quietly took his foot off the
brake,  the  Conservatives  were  able  to  contrast  the  Coalition’s  performance  with  a
caricature  of  what  had  happened  between  1997  and  2010  that  was  by  then  deeply
embedded, namely the idea – hotly disputed by many economists, who point out that the
sums involved were inconsequential, both in relative and absolute terms – that Labour
had “overspent” and run a deficit even when the economy was doing well. That narrative,
and of course the recovery itself – even though it was not accompanied by the kind of
sustained rise in real wages needed to generate a “feel-good factor” – ensured that, by the
time the 2015 election came round, the Tories led Labour as the best party to handle the
economy by some twenty percentage points.
10 Cameron and Osborne were also ruthless, perhaps even more so, in exploiting Labour’s
other big weakness – the widespread perception that it was a soft touch on welfare. Given
the hyperbole that characterised tabloid newspapers’ coverage of the issue, their readers
could be forgiven for thinking that almost everybody claiming benefits was either doing
so fraudulently or as a foreigner, or both – when, that was, in the very worst tabloid case,
they  weren’t  busy  breeding  and  then  killing  their  own  children.5 Naturally,  official
statements  or  ghosted columns put  out  in  the  name of  government  ministers,  were
generally more careful and coded, with Osborne’s headline-grabbing response to the Mick
Philpott  case  perhaps  the  paradigmatic  example.6 They  nonetheless  constituted  a
concerted  and  effective  effort,  exploiting  long-established  and  popularly-held
distinctions between the “undeserving” and the “deserving” poor, to justify money-saving
policy changes by giving the impression that the only losers would be people currently
getting “something for nothing” – the shirkers and skivers rather than the workers and the
strivers. Because it was almost bound to stick up for those who stood to lose out, Labour
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could then be portrayed as a budget-busting friend of the feckless,  with any outrage
expressed  on its  part  at  the  shocking  unfairness  of  the  stereotypes  involved  simply
playing into Osborne’s hands by giving legs to all the stories that helped reinforce those
stereotypes in the first place. And when Labour belatedly tried to go the other way and
attempted to “out-Osborne Osborne” by making some supposedly “tough choices” of its own
on welfare, it was too late to convince voters it was sincere and probably did no more
than legitimize and perpetuate the myths that played so well for the Conservatives in the
first place.
11 Of course, the Conservatives didn’t have everything their own way. They failed, because
of a bust-up with the Liberal Democrats over Lords reform, to achieve a reduction in the
size of the Commons that would have prompted a boundary review estimated to be worth
around twenty additional Tory seats. And on one issue, immigration, which, since the
mid-1960s, has been one of their most reliable weapons in their electoral battles with
Labour, they struggled to maintain credibility. A rash pledge in the run up to the 2010
election  that  a  Tory  government  would  reduce  net  immigration  from  the  EU  from
hundreds  to  tens  of  thousands  backfired  when,  despite  legislation  and  rule  changes
designed  to  “crack  down”,  the  figure  actually  rose  markedly  over  the  course  of  the
Parliament. True, it was UKIP rather than Labour which benefited most from this all-too-
obvious  failure,  despite  Miliband  shifting  his  party’s  stance  on  the  issue  to  a  more
restrictive  one  from  2011  onwards.7 Nevertheless,  the  Tories’  lead  over  their  main
opponent shrank, according to YouGov’s tracker on best party to handle immigration and
asylum, from 28 points (45 vs 17) in May 2010 to just six points (22 vs 16) on the eve of the
general election in May 2015. Meanwhile,  on Europe - where Conservatives have also
come  to  assume  that  they  enjoy  an  advantage  over  Labour  in  these  increasingly
Eurosceptic times - their position was far from strong: certainly any hope that Miliband’s
decision not to match Cameron’s offer to hold an in-out referendum would damage him
proved forlorn – possibly because it was obvious to the electorate that the offer was only
made in order to appease Eurosceptic backbenchers worried about UKIP. The story on
health (traditionally Labour’s strong suit) was not quite as bad, but the issue nonetheless
remained a  problem – and was made worse when the government  went  ahead with
legislation in 2011-12 that totally contradicted their pre-election promise to avoid a “top-
down reorganisation” of the NHS. Prior to the legislation being announced, the Tories had
actually reduced Labour’s lead on the issue to one or two percentage points. After the
announcement, Labour’s lead went back into double figures and, prompted, too, by rising
waiting times, hospital deficits, and local closures, pretty well stayed there until polling
day in 2015.
 
The Short Campaign: March-May 2015
12 To understand why the Conservatives fought the campaign of 2015 the way they did, one
has to go back to the Conservative campaigns of 2005 and 2010. The latter was widely
perceived, not least by those working at Conservative Campaign Headquarters (CCHQ), as
a bit of a mess. Its untested main theme – the Big Society – not only failed to impress, but
was a distraction. Meanwhile nobody was ever quite sure exactly to whom they were
reporting and who had the final word. What a contrast with 2005, when at least everyone
knew who was running the show – the so-called Wizard of Oz, Lynton Crosby – and the
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result,  while dire, was a marked improvement in terms of seats, on the two previous
contests. 
13 Campaign 2015, then, would be the safe if dull one in which Cameron looked and sounded
like a Prime Minister sticking to the game-plan devised by the fabled Australian who was
supposed  to  know what  he  was  doing.  Cameron,  having decided,  along  with  George
Osborne, on the basic strategy – banging on about fears on the part of “business” about a
Labour government; donning hi-viz jackets and hard-hats to emphasise their “long term
economic plan” for “hard-working families”; counter-posing Conservative “competence” with
Labour “chaos”;  talking up the SNP “threat” while simultaneously portraying them as
bullies  and blackmailers;  and badmouthing Miliband as  a  weak and weird individual
whose only decisive act had been to shaft his own brother – left the tactics to the hired
help.  This,  along with the fact  that  Cameron refused to risk a  one-on-one television
debate with Labour’s  leader and confined his  public appearances  to  carefully-crafted
pseudo-events, attracted more brickbats than plaudits – and some concerns even within
the Prime Minister’s own camp. The Tory leader’s response to such criticisms, however,
was essentially limited to rolling up his sleeves at his photo-ops to show how “pumped” he
was and how hard he was working. Other than that, he simply stuck with the programme,
reminding journalists that this was “the most organised, disciplined, clear campaign I have
ever been involved in”.8
14 There were few surprises, then, but there were some raised eyebrows. In particular, the
decision  to  announce,  at  the  same  time  as  continuing  to  pound  away  at  Labour’s
purported  profligacy,  that  a  Conservative  government  would  guarantee  billions  of
additional spending on the NHS, without actually identifying where the money would
come from, was seen as a rather desperate move to prevent Labour from getting as much
traction on health as it hoped. Desperate or not, it may well have done the trick. And the
fact that it could be defended on the grounds that the Tories were good for the money
because, unlike Labour, they could be trusted to grow the economy, was testimony to the
unassailable lead they had built up on the latter – one that meant they felt able to ignore
suggestions that they should somehow match Labour’s promise to tax “non-doms” and
raise the top rate of income tax to 50p,  both policies being intended to tap into the
widespread feeling (reinforced by the so-called omnishambles budget of 2012) that the
Conservatives were “out of touch” and “the party of the rich”. 
15 Clearly, the leadership decided there was little point in wasting time trying directly to
counter such deeply-held prejudices.  Instead, they countered with some prejudices of
their own, using highly supportive newspapers – especially the Sun (“This is the pig's ear Ed
made of a helpless sarnie. In 48 hours, he could be doing the same to Britain”), the Mail (“For
sanity's sake don't let a class-war zealot and the SNP destroy our economy – and our very nation”),
and (to the embarrassment of some of their staff) the Telegraph (“Nightmare on Downing
Street”) and the Times – to ramp up fears of a Miliband-Sturgeon deal and to remind the
public (if they needed reminding) of Ed Miliband’s shortcomings as a leader.9 The party
also used the press, especially in the last week of a campaign when it, like everyone else,
firmly believed that the country was heading for another hung parliament, to question
the legitimacy of any possible attempt by Labour, if it finished behind the Conservatives
in terms of seats, to form a government.
16 Perhaps  the  least-noticed  aspect  of  the  Conservative  campaign,  however,  was  the
decision, taken late in 2014, that, rather than focusing solely on the constituencies they
needed  either  to  defend  or  snatch  from Labour  while  going  easy  on  their  coalition
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partners, the Conservatives would throw a significant proportion of their considerable
financial resources at trying to unseat Liberal Democrats – an effort that gathered pace
during the campaign when frontbenchers were dispatched to seats few had imagined
were in play. Even then, the Tories’ target seats coordinator, Stephen Gilbert, forecast
that the Liberal  Democrats would win around 15 seats – which was way below most
pundits’ guesses but, as it turned out, was almost twice as many as the eight that Nick
Clegg’s party finally ended up with. Clearly, the fact that the Conservatives took 27 seats
from their erstwhile partners was due mostly to the Liberal Democrats losing an average
21 percentage points in seats they held by less than ten points from the Tories in 2010.
But it also had something to do with the fact that Tory candidates in those seats managed
to add an average of nearly 4 percentage points to the vote the party received at the
previous election.
17 This points to the main reason (apart of course from winning all those Liberal Democrat
seats) why the Conservatives were able to win an overall majority in spite of the fact that
Labour actually managed to improve its share of the vote marginally more than they did.
For the first time in a long time, the Tories managed to concentrate their vote in exactly
the right places better than Labour did. In both safe Conservative and safe Labour seats,
the Tories actually slipped by an average of two percentage points compared to 2010. In
those marginal seats they were defending against Labour, however, they increased their
average share by two points, while Labour managed to increase its share by, on average,
less  than  two  points.  That  said,  given  that  Conservative  candidates  in  Labour-held
marginals did not in the main significantly increase their share of the vote, the main
reason they were able to make eight gains from Labour (to offset their ten losses) may
well have been down to some of the Labour vote going to UKIP. The fact that the nearly
fourfold increase in the share of the vote won by Nigel Farage’s party did not damage the
Conservatives  as  much as  expected,  especially  given that  far  more  of  its  voters  had
previously supported the Tories than Labour, was remarkable. It is perhaps a testament
to the effectiveness of the “coalition of chaos” strategy that many of them seem to have
ended up sticking with the Conservatives for fear of letting in Miliband and/or the SNP.
In any case,  the SNP surge played an obviously important role in decimating Labour
representation north of the border, while inflicting no damage on the Tories there – a
major advantage for the Tories, although in the event they would have won an overall
majority even if Labour had maintained its habitual dominance over the Scottish seats. 
 
Why the Conservatives won: post-election polling
evidence
18 Although the Conservatives enjoyed a remarkable victory, one thing seems fairly clear: it
was not because of any great love on the part of the British electorate for the party or an
affinity  to  its  perceived values  or  ideology.  According to  British  Election Study data
gathered shortly before the campaign started,10 Labour just about retained its place as the
most  popular  party  in  terms  of  partisan  identification,  with  27.8%  of  respondents
claiming  to  identify  with  it  (down  from  31%  in  2010),  compared  to  26.1%  for  the
Conservatives (down from 27.1%), and 6.2% for the Liberal Democrats (15.9% in 2010).
Neither was the Conservative Party especially well liked, with an average score of just
3.77 on a scale running from 0 (“dislike”) to 10 (“like”), compared to 4.12 for Labour and
3.02 for the Liberal Democrats; UKIP (5.10), SNP (3.94) and the Greens (3.98) all scored
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more  highly  than  the  Tories  on  this  scale.  Moreover,  the  BES  data  shows  that  the
Conservatives were regarded as being more ideologically remote from the average voter
than most other parties: the mean position of voters on a scale running from 0 (“very left-
wing”) to 10 (“very right-wing”) was almost exactly in the centre, at 4.99, while the Tories
and UKIP were both perceived as being well to the right of this position (at +2.93 and +
2.94 respectively), whereas the other main parties were all regarded as being to the left of
the average voter – and all  were seen as closer than the two right-wing parties;  the
Liberal Democrats were closest (at -0.21), followed by SNP (-1.42), Plaid Cymru (-1.69),
Labour (-1.87) and the Greens (-2.06). 
19 The limited post-election polling evidence that is available at the time of writing suggests
that the same factors that ushered the Conservatives into government in 2010 counted in
their  favour  once  again  in  2015:  perceived  economic  and  leadership  competence.11
Interestingly,  post-election  data  published  by  Lord  Ashcroft  shows  that  the  modal
response to the question of which was the most important issue in 2015 was the NHS
rather than the economy – and this held regardless of whether or not respondents were
asked to consider their own family’s position (58%) or the country’s position as a whole
(55%). 12 One would normally expect it to favour Labour when the NHS is so salient – and
indeed, there was some mileage in this issue for Labour; 76% of those voting Labour cited
health  as  the  most  important  issue  for  the  UK,  whereas  only  39%  of  those  voting
Conservative did. Even so, close behind the NHS in terms of salience was the need to “get
the economy growing and creating jobs” (51%), and 61% of those citing this as one of the
three most  important  issues  voted Conservative,  while  only 50% voted Labour.  More
directly telling, perhaps, is the fact that 46% of respondents (a plurality) agreed with the
statement that “the national economy is not yet fully fixed, so we will need to continue with
austerity and cuts in government spending over the next five years”, including 84% of those
who voted Conservative; by contrast, only 17% of Labour supporters saw things this way,
as did 45% of Liberal Democrat supporters.
20 Further support for the argument that valence considerations weighed decisively in the
balance  is  provided  by  a  Greenberg  Quinlan  Rosler  post-election  poll  that  was
commissioned by the TUC.13 This shows that the top three reasons for supporting the
Conservatives were the feeling that the economy was recovering (39%), that progress that
had been made with deficit-reduction (29%), and the belief that David Cameron would
make a better Prime Minister than Ed Miliband (18%). It is not necessarily that voters
were entirely sold on the detail  of economic policy:  The GQR poll  showed that fewer
people  agreed with the Conservative  position that  the best  way to  get the economy
growing would be to get the deficit under control and cut taxes and red tape (43%) than
with  the  Labour  emphasis  on  ensuring  that  “working  people  feel  better  off  and  more
comfortable spending” (48%). Nevertheless, 40% felt that Labour would “spend too much and
can’t be trusted with the economy”, and 25% felt they would make it “too easy for people to live
off benefits”. A quarter also felt that Labour in government would be “bossed around by
Nicola  Sturgeon  and  the  Scottish  Nationalists”,  which  suggests  that  the  Tories’  negative
campaigning  on  the  theme  of  a  Labour-SNP  “threat”  may  have  resonated  with  a
significant number of voters. More generally, far more respondents saw the Tories as
competent (53%) and having a good track record in government (50%) than Labour, for
whom the respective figures were only 29% and 25%. 
21 For  the  second  election  running  David  Cameron  proved  a  huge  asset  to  his  party’s
electoral prospects. The Ashcroft poll showed that some 71% of Tory voters cited the
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leader as one of the three most important reasons for voting for the party, compared to
just 39% of Labour voters. This is a very striking difference, which is consistent with the
possibility that more and more voters are coming to rely on leadership evaluations as a
heuristic  simplification  to  guide  their  decision  at  a  time  when  policy  debates  are
becoming increasingly complex and almost impossible for non-experts to adjudicate on.14 
22 While these valence considerations certainly mattered at the level of the individual voter,
one other thing should not be overlooked in seeking to understand the unexpected Tory
majority in 2015: the paradoxical impact of Liberal Democrat losses to Labour, of which
the Tories were a serendipitous beneficiary. While disgruntled Liberal Democrat voters
from 2010 probably shifted predominantly to Labour,  this  almost  certainly ended up
helping the Conservatives in terms of overall seat gains. The last BES pre-election panel
showed 27% of the 2010 Liberal Democrats saying that they were intending to shift to
Labour at the general election,  while only 11.2% were planning to vote Conservative.
Moreover,  in  the  seats  that  the  Liberal  Democrats  were  defending  in  2015,  the
Conservatives  lost  0.5%  of  their  vote  on  average,  while  Labour  increased  by  2.7%.
However, this profited Labour relatively little, given that in 33 of the 57 seats that the
Liberal Democrats were defending, their nearest challengers were the Tories, compared
to only 17 in which Labour were the main opponents. Thus, by taking Liberal Democrat
votes, Labour’s electoral progress in such seats more often than not only served to let the
Conservatives win. 
23 One final observation about the electoral standing of the Tories should be made, which
takes  us  back  to  the  point  about  the  party  not  being  especially loved  by  voters,
notwithstanding  the  majority  it  secured  in  the  Commons.  It  is  clear  that  the
Conservatives continue to have some significant image problems, which may hinder them
in the next parliament. The GQR poll shows that the number one doubt voters have about
the Tories is that “they are for the rich and powerful, not ordinary people” (36% expressing
this view). Not far behind (32%) is the feeling that “they can’t be trusted with the NHS” (the
most salient issue at the election, remember), while a mere 29% of voters regarded them
as “honest”. This suggests a picture in which the nation has entrusted the government of
the country to the Conservatives while having their eyes wide open as to the deficiencies
of the party. To put it differently, the Tories may not have a strong bank of political
capital on which to draw when the going gets tough in the years leading up to 2020 – as it
almost  certainly  will,  given  the  challenges  to  be  faced  over  continuing  economic
recovery, and the UK’s political relationships both internally and with the EU. 
 
Conclusion
24 Speaking just after he realised he had won, David Cameron called 2015 his “sweetest victory
”. But, as many commentators rushed to remind him, it has the potential to turn very
sour very quickly. His narrow, 12-seat majority is smaller, it is worth recalling, than the
21-seat majority won by John Major (on 42% of the vote) back in 1992. Moreover, anyone
old enough to remember that time will recall how that victory soon turned to ashes as
Britain’s “Black Wednesday” exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism, the announcement
of  massive  job  losses  in  the  coal  industry  and  parliamentary  rebellions  over  the
Maastricht Treaty,  turned him from hero to zero.  It  is  difficult  at  present to foresee
anything on the immediate economic horizon that could do such dramatic damage to the
Tories’ valuable reputation for competence in that sphere, although the severity of the
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expenditure  cuts  promised by  George  Osborne certainly  has  the  potential  to  tip  the
economy  into  recession  yet  again.  However,  an  arguably  chronic tendency  toward
ideological overreach and internal strife over Europe means that Mr Cameron’s successor,
presuming he makes good on his promise not to seek another term, needs to be careful
not to assume that he or she has the next general election in the bag. He has laid the
foundations, but they need to be built on – and, given the cagey and contingent nature of
the support given to the Conservatives by many of those who voted for them in May 2015,
that building will have to be erected on the centre-ground of British politics rather than
the cloud-cuckoo land inhabited by some of David Cameron’s less pragmatic colleagues.
Still,  for  all  the  dangers  coming  down  the  line,  we  should  acknowledge  Cameron’s
achievement. As the respected political commentator, John Rentoul, put it a few days
after the election, “Overnight, he has transformed from the one-term mechanic called round to
fix  the  deficit,  who  couldn’t  even do  that,  into  a  10-year  prime minister  who  can stamp his
personality on the nation”.15 
25 Cameron may be helped to do that by a Conservative Party that is at last beginning to
look  a  little  bit  more  like  the  country  it  governs.  The  willingness  of  at  least  some
constituency associations to pick (without being pressured to do so) less conventional
Conservative candidates in safe or at least winnable seats means that the Tory benches in
the Commons now contain the party’s highest ever proportion of women, the 68 female
MPs who sit there making up 21% of the party’s contingent in the lower house. The Tories
also have the largest number of non-white MPs they have ever had: a total of 17, seven of
whom are new entrants to the Commons. In addition, «only’ 48% of Tory MPs went to
independent schools (with 34% having been to comprehensives and 18% to grammars),
although this hardly constitutes proportional representation, given that only seven per
cent of pupils currently go to schools outside the maintained sector; it is a drop from the
54% who had been privately educated in 2010 and continues a long-term trend toward
more state-educated Tory MPs. That said, a disproportionate share of the majority of
Tory MPs who are graduates attended elite universities: some 34% of Conservatives in the
Commons were educated at Oxford or Cambridge. If David Cameron was serious when he
talked in the wake of his victory about the Tories becoming “the party of working people”,
then, in this respect at least, he still has a long way to go.
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ABSTRACTS
In the 2015 general election, the Conservative party did not just win an overall parliamentary
majority  against  expectations,  but  they  also  increased  their  national  share  of  the  vote  and
secured additional  seats  in  local  government.  The article  examines  the  long and short  term
campaigns and contrasts the 2010 campaign with the one in 2015 to explain their success.  It
highlights how the Conservatives were able to spin a convincing narrative of Labour economic
incompetence  and  welfare  profligacy  and  capitalise  on  their  opponents’  inner  conflicts  and
voters’ fears of a Labour-SNP coalition. The article argues that their victory is also due to their
command of valence issues and their effective targeting of marginal seats. 
Lors des élections parlementaires de 2015, le parti conservateur n’a pas seulement remporté une
majorité absolue de sièges au Parlement contre toute attente mais a également accru sa part
nationale  des  voix  et  gagné  de  nouveaux  sièges  au  niveau  local.  Cet  article  revient  sur  la
campagne courte et la campagne longue des Conservateurs et oppose la campagne de 2010 à celle
de 2015. Il souligne combien le parti est parvenu à tisser un récit convaincant des années Labour,
arguant de l’incompétence économique de ses opposantes et  de leur prodigalité excessive en
matière de dépenses sociales, tout en exploitant leurs conflits internes et la crainte des électeurs
d’une alliance SNP-Labour. L’article revient sur leur domination de certains sujets électoraux et
leur stratégie pour cibler certains sièges. 
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